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Abstract
The most striking aspect of international antitrust during the last several years has been the
extraordinary proliferation of new statutes and strengthened enforcement of competition laws
throughout the world. Today the great majority of industrialized and emergent economy countries
have antitrust legislation both on the books and in actual practice. Formerly communist countries
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have enacted antitrust laws as part of their shift
to market-oriented economies. Latin American countries have also recently enacted or strength-
ened their antitrust laws and enforcement. Similarly, antitrust has mushroomed in the Pacific
countries, where Japan has gradually been increasing its enforcement and several other countries
have recently enacted or strengthened their antitrust laws, notably Korea and Taiwan. This new
legislation complements the existing enforcement in Australia and New Zealand. Finally, the re-
cent enactment of antitrust laws in Mexico and the strengthened enforcement of Canadian antitrust
laws (after almost a century of relatively benign enforcement) now mark the 1589 North American
continent as a completed bastion of antitrust enforcement.
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The most striking aspect of international antitrust during
the last several years has been the extraordinary proliferation of
new statutes and strengthened enforcement of competition laws
throughout the world. Today the great majority of industrialized
and emergent economy countries have antitrust legislation both
on the books and in actual practice. Formerly communist coun-
tries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have en-
acted antitrust laws as part of their shift to market-oriented econ-
omies.1 Latin American countries have also recently enacted or
strengthened their antitrust laws and enforcement.' Similarly,
antitrust has mushroomed in the Pacific countries, where Japan
has gradually been increasing its enforcement 3 and several other
countries have recently enacted or strengthened their antitrust
laws, notably Korea and Taiwan. This new legislation comple-
ments the existing enforcement in Australia4 and New Zealand.5
Finally, the recent enactment of antitrust laws in Mexico and the
strengthened enforcement of Canadian antitrust laws6 (after al-
most a century of relatively benign enforcement) now mark the
* Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Director, Fordham Corporate Law Insti-
tute. Member of the Advisory Board of the Fordham International Law Journal.
1. For a discussion of the role of competition in formerly communist countries, see
Anna Fornalczyk, Competition Policy During Transformation of A Centrally Planned Economy,
1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 385 (B. Hawk ed. 1993).
2. See, e.g., Ana Jatar, Implementing Competition Policy on Recently Liberalized Economies:
The Case of Venezuela, 1993 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 79 (B. Hawk ed. 1994).
3. Akinori Uesugi, New Directions in Japanese Antitrust Enforcement, 1994 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. - (B. Hawk ed. forthcoming 1995).
4. See generally Maureen Brunt, Australian and New Zealand Competition Law and Pol-
icy, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 131 (B. Hawk ed. 1993).
5. See generally id.; COMPETriON LAW AND POLICY IN NEw ZEAAND (Rex Ahdar, ed.
1991).
6. See generally Calvin Goldman et al., International Mergers and the Canadian Competi-
tion Act, 1992 FoRDHAM CORP. L. INST. 217 (B. Hawk ed. 1993); J. W. Rowley & Ann
Campbell, Commonality and Divergence in Canadian and Australian Competition Law, 1992
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 261 (B. Hawk ed. 1993); Howard Wetston, Developments and
Emerging Challenges in Canadian Competition Law, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 195 (B.
Hawk ed. 1993).
1588
U.K MERGER CONTROL
North American continent as a completed bastion of antitrust
enforcement.
Western Europe has not escaped this proliferation of anti-
trust statutes and increased enforcement. In the last ten years,
newer or strengthened antitrust statutes have been enacted in
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Given this broad acceptance of antitrust principles and en-
forcement, it is fair to conclude that the United States is no
longer the Lone Ranger in world antitrust enforcement. The
United States, however, does remain the most vigorous jurisdic-
tion in applying its own antitrust laws outside its territory.7
The proliferation of antitrust statutes and enforcement has
also included merger control. The number of antitrust laws pro-
viding for notification and approval of mergers, acquisitions,
and joint ventures has increased enormously during the last dec-
ade. Today, there are well over thirty different antitrust merger
controls that might apply to a given transaction, depending
upon the scope of the parties' international operations and the
structure of the transaction, among other factors. These anti-
trust merger controls include not only jurisdictions with long-
standing antitrust controls, such as Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, but also jurisdictions that have
enacted merger regulations only in the last several years, such as
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the European
Union, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal,
Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the Ukraine, among others.
In Western Europe alone, mandatory preclosing notification
requirements now exist in nine jurisdictions:' Austria, Belgium,
the European Union, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Sweden.9 In Western Europe, voluntary preclosing notifica-
tion requirements exist today in France, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. Of the fifteen member states of the European Union,
7. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, [1993] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
70,280 (U.S.). See generally 1 BARRY HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET & INTERNA-
TIONAL ANTITRUST 96-152 (2d ed. Supp. 1993).
8. In Eastern Europe, mandatory preclosing notification requirements exist in at
least a further seven jurisdictions, namely: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia,
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine.
9. See generally 3 HAWK, supra note 7, ch. 15.
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only Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands do
not have antitrust merger control laws.
Against this contemporary background of a world forest of
antitrust merger controls, three jurisdictions stand tall as having
several decades of actual enforcement of antitrust merger con-
trol: Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In
all three jurisdictions there is an extensive body of administrative
practice or case law.
The United Kingdom, however, differs from Germany and
the United States in two respects. First, the U.K. competition
authorities have not issued substantive guidelines, unlike the
merger guidelines issued by the Bundeskartellamt and the U.S.
agencies. Second, there is no authoritative treatise devoted to
U.K. antitrust merger control. Both of these differences make
for greater uncertainty for antitrust and corporate advisers about
U.K merger control than is the case for German and U.S.
merger control, where there are published substantive
guidelines and many learned commentaries.
Very fortunately for lawyers and other advisers, the lack of
substantive guidelines and comprehensive commentary on U.K.
merger control has been remedied by the publication of what
will unquestionably be the bible for U.K. merger control: Roger
Finbow and Nigel Parr's UK Merger Control: Law and Practice
("Finbow & Parr"). Finbow & Parr certainly fills the need for a
comprehensive analysis and description of the U.K. merger con-
trol system. Finbow & Parr also goes a long way in providing sub-
stantive guidelines, although obviously as private practitioners
the authors cannot speak for the U.K. authorities.
Finbow & Parr describes comprehensively the rather byzan-
tine institutional structure of U.K. merger control, which like
Gaul, is divided into three parts: the Office of Fair Trading
("OFT"), the Secretary for Trade and Industry ("STI"), and the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission ("MMC"). This very help-
ful description of the institutional structures complements the
authors' analysis of the U.K procedures, which also are more
complex and multifarious than procedures in other jurisdic-
tions. For example, the authors analyze the three types of volun-
tary notification procedures with considerable emphasis on the
practical advantages and disadvantages among the three proce-
dures. This analysis will be extremely helpful to parties and their
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advisers, particularly as the authors have the considerable cour-
age of providing specific advice and taking positions in recurrent
hypothetical situations. Their pragmatism and sophisticated ad-
vice strikes at least this reviewer as perhaps exceptional in a
world where often it appears that counsel take a more formalistic
approach to the decision to notify a contemplated transaction.
For example, the authors state that: "In practice, only a very
small proportion of mergers qualifying for investigation are re-
ferred to the MMC" and "advisors may be unlikely to recom-
mend [voluntarily] seeking clearance in advance of completion
if in their opinion there is no risk in practice of a reference." 0
This quotation should not distort, however, the general
thrust of the authors' analysis. The book is truly superb in its
discussion of the pros and cons of notification (and the different
ways of notifying) in specific common situations. Indeed, this
discussion, together with the analysis of the substantive criteria
employed by the OFT and MMC, should prove to be the two
most valuable sections of the book to practitioners and merger
parties.
Another very interesting procedural analysis concerns the
de facto time limits for decisions by the OFT/Department of
Trade and Industry ("DTI") and the MMC. Finbow and Parr es-
sentially advocate shortening the OFT/Secretary of State's time
while maintaining the MMC's time to reach decisions. This
seems correct given that the OFT/DTI have up to six months
(proposed to be reduced to only four months) from the date of
announcement or completion of a transaction to decide
whether an MMC referral should be made, while the MMC has
typically three to four months (and there is pressure to reduce
this period) to complete its much more detailed investigation
that might be roughly compared to a "second phase" EEC
Merger Regulation proceeding. Certainly, the U.K. time periods
are out of line with deadlines and time periods in other jurisdic-
tions, especially the first phase period for the OFT/DTI.
The authors also score a number of good points in discuss-
ing notification fees. They find the U.K. fees burdensome. The
U.K. fees, however, compared with the U.S. fees under Hart-
Scott-Rodino (now US$45,000 per notification), are quite mod-
10. ROGERJ. FiNuow & A. NIGEL PARR, U.K. MERGER CONTROL: LAW AND PRAcncE
5, 7 (1995) [hereinafter FINBow & PARR].
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est. The unfortunate reality in the world today is that govern-
ments are beginning to appreciate the cash cow value of merger
control notification fees which raise considerable revenues even
though the great majority of transactions raise no competition
concerns whatsoever.
Finbow & Parr also contains a helpful analysis of the kind of
transactions that qualify under the U.K. legislation. For exam-
ple, they devote considerable attention (and rightly so) to issues
like control and material influence over the target such as to
qualify a transaction as a "merger" under the U.K. legislation. In
doing so, they compare the U.K. tests for acquisition of minority
shareholdings with the approach under the EEC Merger Regula-
tion. For example, they assert that "[t] he decisions taken by the
Commission so far in relation to the concept of decisive influ-
ence suggest that a higher degree of involvement in an under-
taking's affairs is required than that which would give rise to ma-
terial influence under the Fair Trading Act." 1 Although this
may have been true two years ago, more recent cases under the
EEC Merger Regulation suggest that there has been a strong
convergence between the U.K. approach to acquisition of minor-
ity shareholdings and the approach under the EEC Merger Reg-
ulation.12
In a somewhat, similar vein, the authors' discussion of the
concentrative-cooperative joint venture distinction under the
EEC Merger Regulation reflects a two-year old perspective and
does not take entirely into account more recent Commission
practice nor the recently revised Commission notice on that sub-
ject.'1 Of course, these minor caveats detract in no way from the
authors' principal goal of analyzing U.K. merger control, but
only suggest some caution about their comparison of the U.K.
system with the EEC Merger Regulation practice.
As mentioned above, the U.K. authorities have not seen fit
to issue substantive merger guidelines, unlike their counterparts
in Canada, Germany, and the United States. Finbow & Parr goes
a long way, however, in providing the practitioner and merger
11. Id. at 39.
12. See, e.g., Commission Decision, Case No. IV/M.526 (Eur. Comm'n Dec. 14,
1994) (DLJMB/UBS/Sappi/Warren) (not yet reported).
13. Commission Notice, O.J. C 385/1 (1994) (on distinction between concentra-
tive and cooperative joint ventures under Council Regulation No. 4064/89/EEC of De-
cember 1989 on control of concentrations between undertakings).
U.K. MERGER CONTROL
adviser with a private substitute for official substantive U.K.
guidelines. They note generally in the overview chapter that the
U.K. voluntary notification system and enforcement history re-
flect the basic "presumption" underlying the Act that a merger
should be allowed absent a "real expectation" of significant ad-
verse effects on the public interest.'4 In later chapters they pro-
ceed to analyze in some detail the various facets of a substantive
merger analysis.
There is an excellent summary of relevant product and geo-
graphic market definition. The authors first describe how the
OFT largely follows the analytical framework set forth in the U.S.
Merger Guidelines, despite acknowledged differences with the
approach under the EEC Merger Regulation. 5 The analysis of
relevant product and geographic market definition is again prac-
titioner-oriented. The authors identify various factors and evi-
dence typically taken into account by the OFT and MMC in their
analysis of market definition' 6 Market share and non-market
share factors are also analyzed in considerable detail and one
finishes the book with the strong impression that one has ob-
tained intimate familiarity with the actual analysis employed by
the U.K. competition authorities.
Theoreticians, as well as practitioners, also will benefit con-
siderably from the authors' discussion of collusion/oligopoly co-
ordination. Their suggested analytical framework for examining
mergers in oligopolistic industries is exceptional in both its brev-
ity and thoughtfulness.
In sum, Finbow & Parr should immediately become the in-
dispensable treatise on U.K. merger control. It will prove invalu-
able to practitioners and business advisors, as well as providing
provocative thoughts to academics and others interested in com-
parative merger control. No advisor to parties engaged in inter-
national transactions can afford not to have Finbow & Parr on
their bookshelf close at hand.
14. FINBOW & PAg, supra note 10, at 1.
15. See id. at 174-78.
16. See id. at 178-201.
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